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Tag: 11th Circuit

Covid-19 Pandemic Related Caregiver Discrimination

August 26, 2022

For individuals with caregiving responsibilities (“caregivers”), the effects of the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic go beyond work obligations. While navigating hybrid work schedules and tighter shifts, they must also find time for their duties to spouses, children, and disabled relatives. These individuals may live with children too young to receive the vaccine or relatives who are immunocompromised. As they juggle work and caregiving duties, they may face employment related discrimination because of these pandemic-related caregiving responsibilities. Fortunately, the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provides regulations to protect employees from workplace prejudice because of any caregiving obligations they may have to family members and loved ones. This article will summarize those guidelines to assist employers and employees in addressing pandemic-related caregiving discrimination. 

When Does Workplace Caregiver Discrimination Violate US Employment Laws? 

According to the EEOC, employers violate US employment laws when they discriminate against an employee/applicant with caregiver responsibilities based on their sex (sexual orientation and gender identity), pregnancy status, race, age, national origin, religion, disability, or genetic information. It is also unlawful for an employee to discriminate against an employee/applicant based on their association or caregiving responsibilities to people with disabilities or other protected characteristics (race, ethnicity, etcetera). 

What About Caregiving Triggers Discrimination Considerations?

Making employment decisions based on gender stereotypes is also illegal. For example, when the company fails to hire female applicants because they assume they would focus more on caring for their children and elderly relatives than on their work. Even further, EEOC regulations prohibit punishing female employees more harshly than male colleagues for absences or missed deadlines because of pandemic-related caregiving obligations. These regulations apply to discrimination against male employees, as well. It is unlawful to discriminate against male staff who are caregivers based on gender stereotypes that women are caretakers while men are breadwinners. Employers may not deny male employees leave or requests for a flexible schedule to attend to family members or loved ones infected with COVID-19 if they grant such requests to female staff. 

What About LGBTQ Employees and Applicants?

EEOC regulations prohibit discrimination against LGBTQ employees and applicants with caregiving responsibilities because of their sexual orientation. Employers may not deny requests for flexible hours or office leave from these individuals because of their gender identity if they grant permission to such requests from other staff members. They may also not require these employees to grow through rigorous procedures before granting their leave requests if other workers do not go through such processes. 

What About Discrimination Against an Employee With Caregiving Responsibilities Based on Race and Ethnicity?

Discriminating an employee with caregiving obligations because of their race, ethnicity, or national origin is illegal under EEOC laws. 

For instance, managers may not require black or Asian employees to go through burdensome processes to obtain leave or a flexible work schedule to take care of a relative, while others have their requests granted without such procedures. 

Employers may also not deny an employee’s requests for leave to care for a loved one from another country with a COVID-19 infection because a COVID-19 variant was identified in the infected individual’s home nation. 

Caregiver workplace harassment or discrimination based on citizenship or immigration status is also unlawful under Department of Justice laws. 

What About Discrimination Because of Caregiving Responsibilities to an Individual With Disabilities?

Under EEOC regulations, it is illegal to discriminate against an employee who is a caregiver to an individual with disabilities because of their association with the care recipient. Some instances where such discrimination can occur include refusal to: 

  • promote or hire an applicant/employee who is a parent to a child with a mental health disability that escalated during the pandemic because the applicant/staff would not show commitment to their duties due to their caregiving obligations. 
  • hire an applicant who has a spouse with a disability that has a risk of severe illness from COVID-19 infection because the employer wants to avoid the increased health insurance costs when the company includes the ailing spouse in its healthcare plan. 
  • include the applicant’s spouse in the company’s health insurance plan after hiring the applicant because of the disability mentioned above.

Reasonable Accommodation for Caregivers Under US Federal Employment Laws

EEOC regulations do not give US employees a right to workplace accommodations (telework, flexible schedules, overtime, etcetera) because of their caregiving duties. 

However, other US laws make provisions for such employee rights, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act. The act allows workers to request office leave for caregiving purposes. 

Other state and local laws also provide reasonable accommodations for workers with caregiving obligations. That said, employers can grant workplace accommodations to staff who are caregivers at their discretion, as long as they do so in a non-discriminatory manner. 

How Employees Can Respond to Discrimination Based on Covid-19 Related Caregiver Status 

Employees with caregiver status who are victims of discrimination because of their race, gender, sexual orientation, or affiliations with a person with a disability should report the harassment/discrimination to their employers. 

State, local government, and private sector employees should report discrimination incidences to the EEOC, state, or local government agencies responsible for employment discrimination. They may file their complaints with the EEOC within 180 in states without a local EEO agency and 300 days in states with a local EEO agency. 

Federal workers should report discrimination cases to their agency’s EEO office within 45 days. State and local government anti-discrimination agencies also have timelines for state and local government employees to report harassment cases. 

Employers and their staff can obtain further details on caregiver discrimination from the EEOC’s caregiver discrimination policy guidance, associated fact sheet, and employer best practices document. 

To sum it up…

US employment laws prohibit all kinds of workplace discrimination. If you’ve been a victim of workplace harassment because of your caregiver status, you can take steps to protect your rights and those of other employees. At the Law of Office of Sheri Oluyemi, we bring our experience in US employment laws to help employees get justice at work. Reach out to us today to request a free teleconference, and let’s safeguard your right to fair treatment in your workplace.

Discrimination Based on Hair?: The CROWN Act 

July 5, 2022

Crown Act passes US House of Representatives

On March 18, 2022, the US house of representatives passed the CROWN ACT banning “discrimination based on an individual’s texture or style of hair.” The bill, first introduced to the house in 2021 by Representative Bonnie Watson Coleman, was passed in a vote of 235-189. It currently is being read in the US Senate.

While this is the first time the bill is getting approval at the federal level, it has already made its way into state legislation across several states in the US. In 2019, California became the first state to pass the CROWN ACT into law by a unanimous vote. Twelve other states, including New York, Washington, Nebraska, Delaware, Oregon, and Colorado, would eventually follow suit between 2019 and 2021. Here in Georgia, the CROWN ACT is not yet law.

What Is the Crown Act as Relates to Discrimination Based on Hair?

The CROWN ACT stands for Creating a Respectful and Open World for Natural Hair. According to the bill, “Routinely, people of African descent are deprived of educational and employment opportunities because they are adorned with natural or protective hairstyles in which hair is tightly coiled or tightly curled, or worn in locks, cornrows, twists, braids, Bantu knots, or Afros.”

Black people have often faced racial discrimination across corporate America because of how they groom their natural hair. According to one study, employers perceive black women with natural hairstyles as less competent and professional (and less likely to be recommended for job interviews) than black or white women with straight hairstyles. In 2016, Sabrina Chiodo, assistant manager at Jack Astor’s Bar and Grill, sent home 20-year old Akua Agyemfra for wearing her hair in a bun (contrary to restaurant policy that all female staff wear their hair down). Elsewhere, in Louisiana, Imani Jackson lost her job at American Screening LLC within a month of wearing her natural hair in a bun instead of the wig she had worn during her interview and her first month working at the company. But it’s not only African-American women that suffer from racial discrimination because of their hair. In 2018, Andrew Johnson, a black high school wrestler, was told by a referee to cut his dreadlocks or forfeit a wrestling match. It is cases like these that the CROWN ACT seeks to address and outlaw. 

What Are the Effects of the CROWN ACT on Discrimination?

The CROWN ACT prohibits racial discrimination based on a person’s hair. This discrimination is often unspoken in US workplaces but ladened in employee handbooks that specify company policy. As such, the CROWN ACT would be a significant step to enabling a more diversified and inclusive corporate America. In the wake of the CROWN ACT, more companies will adopt new policies that allow women of color to groom their natural hair the way they deem fit without discrimination. Also, before the CROWN ACT, cases of race-based hair discrimination that have made it to US courts have failed to yield substantial results. For instance, in 2014, US District Court Judge Charles R. Butler Jr dismissed a race-based hair discrimination case involving Chastity Jones and Catastrophe Management Systems.  In 2016, a three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision and further attempts to get the US Supreme Court to intervene failed to yield results. 

However, if the US Senate passes the CROWN ACT into law, it would provide the necessary legal protection for victims of race-based hair discrimination, especially since there’s currently no other federal legislation in the US that protects people of color from stigmatization because of their hair. 

Furthermore, since its inception in California in 2019, the CROWN ACT has created awareness and kick-started healthy conversations about racial discrimination based on a person’s hair. These conversations will only become more mainstream once the bill becomes federal law. 

Conclusion

Workplace discrimination based on hair is more common than we realize for people of color. The stigma behind natural hair for black people has often deprived them of educational and employment opportunities. However, the narrative should change once the CROWN ACT becomes federal law. If you’re a black person in the US facing race-based hair discrimination at your workplace or school, hiring legal help is the best course of action to protect your rights.

Or, if you are an employer seeking to create an inclusive dress policy or dress code with specifications about hair, contact us.If you want to review your company’s policy surrounding natural hair in the wake of the CROWN ACT, our expert team of lawyers can also assist you throughout the process and ensure there are no grey areas that could get you into a potential lawsuit.

At the Law Office of Sheri Oluyemi, we have the best legal hands in US employment law to handle workplace discrimination. Reach out to us today; let’s look at your case and begin proceedings to get you justice.

Not Cheaper, Not Quicker: Pitfalls of Mandatory Arbitration

June 28, 2019

Alternative dispute resolution became all the rave for a cheaper and quick route to solve legal issues. Employers bought into the idea quite heavily under the misunderstanding that arbitration is faster, less formal, and less expensive than bringing a case to court. But, this may not always be true.

It is important for all parties to clearly think their options through before deciding what to do – just because arbitration is an available option does not mean it is always the best one. Take for example, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals case Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors, Inc., No. 17-13057, 2018 WL 3761126 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2018). In that case, Julio Hernandez claimed that his employer, Acosta Tractors, failed to pay him overtime, and he brought an action in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  Acosta Tractors moved to dismiss the case because Mr. Hernandez signed an arbitration agreement. The judge agreed and dismissed Mr. Hernandez’s case in favor of arbitration.

Once in arbitration, things started to go poorly for Acosta Tractors. Mr. Hernandez was one of three employees who were arbitrating FLSA claims. Acosta Tractors asked the arbitrator to consolidate the three proceedings into one, but the arbitrator refused. Then, the arbitrator refused to limit discovery, resulting in the taking of 29 depositions in the three separate proceedings. 

It is important for parties to understand that an arbitrator is essentially a judge on retainer. Meaning that when they work on a case, arbitrators bill the parties for their work. And, if a third-party organization like the American Arbitration Association or Henning Mediation & Arbitration Service, Inc. is involved, they will charge for their work managing the case as well. Neither of these two costs are applicable in court proceedings.

Acosta Tractors soon received bills for administrative fees of over $100,000.00 for Mr. Hernandez’s case and the other two similar cases, much much more than the amounts in dispute for the claimants. Acosta Tractors refused to pay the arbitration fees, and then asked the federal judge to return the matter to court on the grounds that “the Arbitration of this matter has failed of its essential purpose.”  The judge declined, ruling instead, that Acosta Tractor defaulted in arbitration, and thus was also in default in federal court.  The judge entered a default judgment in Mr. Hernandez’s favor in the amount of $7,293.00.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the trial judge should not have entered a default judgment based solely upon the failure to pay administrative fees in arbitration. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit directed the trial judge to determine whether Acosta Tractors “acted in bad faith in choosing not to pay its arbitration fees.”  The court noted that “[a] calculated choice to abandon arbitration after getting adverse rulings from the arbitrator certainly looks like forum shopping.” 

In this case, Acosta Tractors was billed $25,875 in administrative fees on an overtime claim that was worth $7,293.00.  In the end, this is $18,582 Acosta Tractor could have saved by either settling the claim, or by keeping this FLSA case in federal court. This demonstrates that the decision to arbitrate a claim is not a guarantee that the arbitration will be less expensive than an action in court, or that it will be less onerous in the discovery stage.

The biggest lesson for employers to learn from Hernandezis the need to consider the cost of arbitration both when drafting agreements and in seeking to enforce them. Arbitration may be expensive for all parties, especially the employer who is usually on the hook for arbitrator and administrative fees. A carefully drafted arbitration agreement can include terms such as fee-sharing, limited discovery and right of appeal ensure that arbitration lives up to the ADR hype.

Encounters of the Hostile Kind: What Do You Need to Prove a Racially Based Hostile Work Environment?  

March 20, 2019

Meet Brenda Smelter. She is a black woman that was hired by Southern Home Care Services, Inc. d/b/a/ ResCare Homecare in July 2013 as a Customer Service Supervisor. She was the only black person who worked in her office, she replaced a white employee who was away from the office on maternity leave. Brenda struggled with performing her job but most distressing at work was that she often overheard co-workers making racist comments about black people; sometimes these comments were made directly to her face and in the presence of others, including members of management.

The severity of these racist comments peaked on the last day of her employment when a co-worker called her a “dumb black nigger” during an argument. According to Smelter, she was fired for reporting this epithet, along with her co-workers’ other racist comments, to her direct supervisor. The reason Southern Care provided for the termination was “poor fit” citing performance concerns and chaos. After her termination, she was replaced by a white employee, in addition to the return of her predecessor, also white, from maternity leave.

Brenda sued Southern Home under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, asserting claims for discriminatory termination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Smelter contends that Southern Home (1) discriminated against her by permitting a hostile work environment to exist at the office, (2) discriminated against her by terminating her because of her race, and (3) retaliated against her for reporting her co-workers’ racist comments.

After the case was dismissed by the District Court, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that Smelter’s discriminatory termination and retaliation claims fail because she provided insufficient evidence of pretext in response to Southern Home’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her. But the 11th Circuit Court disagreed that, as a matter of law, the harassment Smelter suffered was not severe or pervasive and Southern Home lacked notice of that harassment.

Thus, in October 2018, the 11th Circuit Court gave us a recent window into the elements required to establish a racially based hostile work environment claim.

To prove a hostile work environment claim, an employee must show that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” When the employee’s harassment claim is based on her race, she must prove five elements: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her race, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment, and (5) the employer is responsible for the environment.

Typically at issue, as was the case here, is the “severe and pervasive” threshold. To establish that harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of her employment, an employee must prove that her work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. In other words, the employee must first establish that she “subjectively perceive[d] the environment to be abusive.” Then she also must satisfy the objective component by showing that her work environment was one “that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.”

Beginning with Smelter’s subjective perception of her work environment. Smelter repeatedly testified that enduring her co-workers’ racist comments was stressful and hurtful. She also explained that it felt like the harassment “never stopp[ed],” as though her co-workers were pushing her to “see how much she [could] take” in the hopes that she would “just quit and leave.” The Court found this testimony sufficient to demonstrate subjective belief in the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct.

The employer objected that Smelter’s failure to report the incidents indicate a lack of subjective believe in the harassment. Precedent recognizes, however, that an employee’s failure to report harassment is not dispositive of whether the employee perceived the environment created by the harassment as hostile or abusive. 

Regarding objectivity, the facts sufficient to meet this threshold were: 

1.    Pervasiveness, also known as Frequency

Smelter endured racist remarks by her co-workers nearly every day that she worked in that office. There were at least 8 racist comments in 2 months that Smelter could recall with specificity.

2.    Severity

Brenda endured the following comments: black men were “lazy” and “the scum of the earth; “black women[] ha[d] babies on welfare,” President Barack Obama’s “big ears” made him “look[] like a monkey,” and she did not know that black people could be buried on Sundays; Smelter’s hair made her look like a “mixed monkey” from the movie Planet of the Apes; an occasion when black people were exiting a bus at a Wal-Mart store was described as looking like they were “chained together.”; and a desire expressed to “send them all back . . . to Africa.”. A co-worker “jumped up . . in a rage” and said “get out of my office . . . you dumb black nigger.” in doing so she “hit the desk” like she was about “to charge at” Smelter. 

 The Court held that these comments were directed at Brenda to humiliate her and were egregious even just once because it was preceded by two months of related abuse, thus, they were severe.

3.    “Physically threatening or humiliating”

See point number 2; the comments were severely humiliating. The Court stated that “physical threat” is not always a dispositive requirement.

4.    Altered job performance is optional in light of totality of other circumstances 

Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned that harassment need not be . . . so extreme that it produces tangible effects on job performance in order to be actionable.”

5.    Because the comments were made by co-workers, management needed to be aware or made aware of the harassing conduct and must also have failed to take prompt remedial action

Here, there was a concession that no report was made until the day of termination but there might have been actual notice because Smelter testified that everyone thought the slurs were funny and that others, including management, overheard the slurs. Smelter also testified that members of management overheard these comments and were amused by them, but she never made a formal report until the day of her termination. 

Take away for employees making this claim: this case demonstrates the type of hostility that makes the threshold for a hostile work environment claim.

Take away for employers defending such a claim: the company must take prompt remedial action if any members of management have actual or constructive notice of this type of hostility.

How Long Is Too Long: Leave of Absence Under the ADA

April 20, 2018

Can finite leave of absence of more than one month can be a reasonable accommodation?

Federal circuit courts have rendered conflicting decisions regarding how much leave is reasonable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Although given the opportunity to settle the dispute, earlier this month the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a multi-month leave of absence is beyond the scope of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

The Seventh Circuit had issued two decisions holding that even if the employee had a disability and an essential requirement of the job was impaired by the disability, the employee was not a qualified individual entitled to ADA protections on the reasoning that the accommodation sought (a multi-month leave) would not help the employee do the job, but would keep the employee from performing job functions altogether.

Ultimately the Seventh Circuit found that while the ADA may require brief periods of medical leave, such as days or even weeks, multiple month long periods of leave are not required under the ADA. The Court stated: “…not working is not a means to perform the job’s essential functions…”.

The Eleventh Circuit (in which the State of Georgia is located) is of the same opinion.

While it seems all appeals courts, and even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), agree that indefinite leave is never a requirement, the EEOC disagrees with the Courts in that it has stated that placing a limit on the amount of disability leave to which an employee is entitled is a clear violation of the ADA.

Given the EEOC’s opinion on the issue, Georgia employers are not advised to take the position of rigidity with regards to how much leave is reasonable. Rather, employers are encouraged engage in the interactive process, consider each case individually, and err on the side of caution until further notice from SCOTUS.

Protected Status + Adverse Employment Action = Discrimination?

April 14, 2018

Often employees are convinced they are victims of discrimination at the hands of employers, through its management or supervisory staff. Often, certain issues are also clear including the employee’s membership in a protected category: Black, female, Muslim, pregnant, for instance, and the employee having experienced a specific adverse employment decision such as dismissal, failure to promote, under compensation, etc. However, it is rarely ever crystal clear that an employee can link the protected category to the adverse decision. Essentially, the employee must clearly answer the question: why, exactly, is this happening to me?

A recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which applies to Georgia, Florida and Alabama gives us a good example of the everyday behaviors at the workplace capable of answering this question: “why”.

In EEOC v Exel, the Court upheld a jury verdict awarding back pay on the finding that an employer’s policy of hiring current employees over external candidates was pretextual for sex discrimination. First, the Court accepted evidence that the policy was not mandatory nor was it uniformly applied. Thus, even though neutral on its face, the policy could be bypasssed and used as a cover for other nefarious hiring decisions. Next, the Court identified such nefarious bias (in this case it was against a woman), in the following actions of the hiring manager:

  • “limited his contact with pretty much all the females in [the] office”

  • asked another to “manage the ladies in the office.”

  • was “standoffish” with female employees

  • treated female employees differently than male employees

  • would come into work in the morning and “go straight to his office..”

  • “…wouldn’t speak to any of [the female employees].”

  • stated several times “that he would never put a woman in a management position”

The Court found this evidence is to be “sufficient to tie “generalized discriminatory behavior to the specific employment decision at issue.””

For employers, this case warns of the use of a preferential policy, even though apparently neutral, could be problematic in its day-to-day application.

For employees who think they are being discriminated against, this case gives an example of the sort of evidence required to be successful at trial.

Case Summary: Pregnancy Discrimination Act Protects Breastfeeding

September 27, 2017

In STEPHANIE HICKS v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA, the 11th Circuit Court held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) guarantees women the right to be free from discrimination in the workplace based on gender-specific physiological occurrences – including breastfeeding.

Stephanie Hicks brought this civil action against the Tuscaloosa Police Department under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Ms. Hicks worked first as a patrol officer and then as an investigator on the narcotics task force. When she became pregnant she requested assignments that prevented late night work and weekend work, this was granted but only after being demoted only eight days after returning from FMLA leave. Hicks overheard multiple conversations in which officers of the police department used defamatory and sexist language about her. After the baby was born, Ms. Hicks requested accommodations that would have allowed her to breastfeed in the workplace and would have excused her from duties which required wearing a vest that according to her doctor could cause a breast disease that would inhibit breastfeeding. These accommodation requests were denied.  Ms. Hicks viewed these actions as a constructive discharge and filed suit.

Ms. Hicks prevailed at a jury trial wherein she was awarded $161,319.92 plus costs and attorney fees. The City appealed but the 11th Circuit Court, of which the State of Georgia is included, affirmed the decision.

The Court stated the important legal tests as follows:

  • The PDA amended Title VII to include discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” – the ultimate question is “whether the evidence, when viewed as a whole, yields the reasonable inference that the employer engaged in the alleged discrimination.

  • Under the FMLA the ultimate questions are whether: “(1)Hicks availed herself of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) [s]he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.

In application of these tests to the facts as summarized above, the Court concluded there was ample evidence that Hicks was both discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy and that she was retaliated against for taking her FMLA leave. Furthermore, the Court found that the PDA covers discrimination against breastfeeding mothers and the City’s failure to accommodate Hicks’s requests, when it allowed accommodations to others similarly situated, constituted discriminatory constructive discharge, in violation of the PDA.