Covid-19 Q&A Session – Legal Implications of the Coronavirus
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While most people expect to enjoy privacy rights at all times, there are certain limitations to these laws in the workplace setting.
Today, employers rely on technology more than ever to run their business and monitor workplace communications. And, Georgia law protects the employers’ right to monitor certain workplace areas for legitimate reasons despite many employees believing that video surveillance or monitoring is an intrusion of their privacy.
It is important for employers to understand when and how they can use these rights. This will help employers to make effective workplace policies and avoid privacy claims.
Emails sent through a company’s computer systems are an employer’s property. Employers have the right to view and monitor employees’ emails for valid business reasons. Note that employers often submit email records in courts as evidence to prove an employee’s wrongdoing.
Furthermore, employers have the right to track the browsing history of their employees. The employers reserve the right to block specific internet sites or limit the time an employee may spend on specific sites, such as YouTube.
Many employers use electronic surveillance systems to monitor the voicemail messages and phone conversations. While the law protects employers’ right to record calls to and from their office, there are certain limitations.
Under the Electronics Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), employers cannot monitor the personal phone calls of their employees, even if they made the call on the work premises. Employers can only monitor personal telephonic conversations of employees with their consent.
In addition, the ECPA protects employee’s personal voicemail messages. Employers can face legal consequences for reading, disclosing, deleting, or preventing access to an employee’s voicemail messages.
Placement of cameras in the common areas of the workplace is legal as long as it is for legitimate business reasons. Some of the valid legal grounds for conducting video surveillance in workplace settings include providing security and preventing theft.
It is important to know that there are legal limits to places where the employers can place the cameras. Generally, employers can place cameras in areas where the employees have little to no expectation of privacy. In Georgia, the employers cannot place cameras in the restrooms, break areas, and changing rooms.
In addition, employers should be careful when conducting audio recordings in the workplace. Note that Georgia law prohibits wiretapping; it is unlawful for a third-party non-participant to overhear, transmit, or record private conversations intentionally.
If the video cameras are also taping sound, employers may run the risk of breaking wiretapping laws, even if the employer had legitimate reasons for video surveillance. Therefore, it is better for employers to notify their employees of the existence of cameras.
Drug testing in the workplace is legal in many states. The employer can ask prospective or existing employees to submit to drug screening. However, the circumstances in which an employer may test employees for drugs and the methods of drug testing vary from one state to another.
The Georgia Drug-Free Workplace law requires employers to maintain a drug-free environment in the workplace. The law offers discount on workers’ compensation insurance premiums to employers who follow certain regulations, including applicant drug testing.
The law requires employers to notify the employees about drug testing in writing. Employees must have 60 days of notice of the policy. Employees testing positive for drugs have 5 days’ time to explain their drug use.
Employers can ask employees to submit to drug testing in the following circumstances
When the employee is currently enrolled or has recently completed a drug rehabilitation program. However, if the employee entered the rehab voluntarily and not due to a positive drug test, then there is no need to test the employee for drugs.
When the employee gets involved in a work-related accident allegedly due to drug abuse.
When the employer has reasonable evidence that the employee is using drugs.
When the employee exhibit behavioral changes, such as slurred speech or glassy eyes.
Knowledge of these rules can help employers avoid a privacy related claim, but stay tuned if regardless of having done everything right, your company has received a claim.
Workplace injuries can cause serious disruptions to an employee’s finances, career, and mental health. In Georgia, the law requires employers with more than 3 employees to purchase workers’ compensation insurance from a licensed insurer to provide workers’ compensation benefits to employees who sustain workplace injury or illness. Upon filing a successful claim, the insurance company pays for the medical expenses and lost wages of the employee.
Due to the fact that workers compensation is usually resolved between the employee, the insurance company and the workers compensation board, a small business employer rarely requires its own representation. However, an attorney may still be necessary when the employer lacks insurance coverage in the first place or when the employee commences litigation against the employer instead of filing and settling a workers compensation claim.
Thus, it’s necessary to understand the potential for liability.
The law provides benefits for categories of claimants who become totally or partially disabled on a temporary or permanent basis.
This article addresses Temporary Disability generally. It does not constitute legal advice nor does is substitute for reading the statute.
Temporary Total Disability
Under the law, employers must provide temporary total disability wage replacement benefits to employees who cannot work due to work-related injury or illness for at least seven (7) days in an amount of two-thirds of the average weekly pay she was receiving before the injury up to the allotted cap and until she shows “maximum medical improvement” or until seven and a half years (400 weeks) from the date of injury, whichever is earlier.
Employees with catastrophic injuries, such as severe burns, head injury, or paralysis, are exempted from this rule.
An employee can receive payment for the seven day elimination period if the employee finds herself incapacitated for 3 consecutive weeks following the injury.
It is important to know that the average weekly wage cap changes every July. As of July 1, 2019, the maximum weekly wage in Georgia is $675.
Temporary Partial Disability
If an employee has a temporary partial disability, it means she can come to work but cannot perform strenuous duties. As a result, the employer may give her light-work and the employee may receive a lesser amount than what she was earning before the injury. In such cases, the employers must provide temporary partial wage replacement benefits to the employee.
The employee would receive two-thirds of the difference between het average weekly pay before and after the injury. For instance, if the employee was earning $1200 per week, but now her earnings have reduced to $600, she can receive two-thirds of the difference ($400).
There is a cap on temporary partial disability benefits as well. As of July 1, 2019, the maximum is $450 per week.
Stay tuned for the next segment of this series which will address workers compensation disability benefits for permanently disabled employees.
What does a public employer do when a job applicant’s test comes back positive?
In the business world, employers sometimes ask job applicants to submit themselves to drug tests. A drug test can be completed either through a urine sample or hair follicle, depending on the County or State. So, what happens when the test results come back positive?
A few 11th Circuit decisions have weighed in on the issue of the best way for public employers to deal with a job applicant’s positive test results. In Voss v. City of Key West, Voss applied for a position as a Solid Waste Coordinator at a train station. When asked to undergo a preemployment drug test, she refused, and filed an action challenging the constitutionality of the city’s workplace policy after she was not hired. The United States district court, in making its decision, gave employers three things to look out for before making an employment decision after an applicant’s test results return positive.
1. Verify the importance of the test to the company or organization to determine whether it justifies a fourth amendment intrusion. In Voss, the Court decided that the reasons that the city gave for conducting a drug test for job applicants were not justified. The city claimed that the test was created to protect the public from motor vehicle accidents and personal injury to the employees and the public; stating that employees who use illegal drugs tend to be “less productive, less reliable and prone to greater absenteeism.”
2. Ensure the desired position is one that is safety-sensitive. The position at issue in Voss was a Solid Waste Coordinator and the court found that this was not really a safety-sensitive position. Because, among other reasons, the city does not subject the Solid Waste Coordinator to random drug testing to which it subjects employees the policy classifies as “public safety positions”.
3. Distinguish between employees and applicants before carrying out a drug test. If the tests are disclosed to applicants before they apply, then they have the opportunity to withdraw their applications or not apply at all before any invasive tests are carried out. The court advised that employers should make sure that applicants have knowledge of the test before they submit their applications.
More recently, as the issues of opioid and medical marijuana workplace pervasiveness rise to a head, both public and private sector employers must remember to consider the requirements of the American Disability Act.
The ADA requires employers who are aware of a disability to provide a reasonable accommodation that would permit the disabled employee to perform the essential functions of her job. Accordingly, when an applicant’s drug test comes back positive the employer should inquire whether the applicant is taking such medication for medical reasons before making a decision on hiring the applicant. Essentially the results of this inquiry could lead to a requirement to commence, and participate in, the interactive process pursuant to the ADA.
In conclusion, if an employer is able to justify their reasons for requesting a pre-employment drug test, show that the position for which the test is required is safety-sensitive, disclose the requirement for a test to the applicant in advance of the application, and consider its obligations under the ADA, only then is the employer is free to make decisions based on its employee relations policies.
The Federal Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay overtime to employees who work over 40 hours in a workweek, unless the employee works in an “exempt” position. There are various classes of exempt employees, one of which is the executive, administrative and professional employees (i.e., the “white-collar” exemption). Generally, to qualify for the “white-collar” exemption, an employee:
must be paid a fixed weekly salary (the “salary basis test”), and
must primarily perform executive, administrative or professional duties in accordance with the Department of Labor regulations (the “duties test”).
Released on September 24, 2019 but effective January 1, 2020, the Trump Administration has announced its intention to revise the salary threshold for white collar employees and highly compensated employees. The new regulations do the following:
Increase the threshold salary earnings for exempt executive, administrative and professional employees (i.e., the “white-collar” exemption) by 50% from $455 per week ($23,660 annually) to $684 per week ($35,568 annually) and for highly compensated employees from $100,000 annually to $107,432 annually.
Allow employers to use non-discretionary bonuses and incentive payments, in kind commissions paid at least annually, to satisfy up to 10 percent of the salary threshold.
Permit employers to make a “catch up” payment if an employee does not earn enough non-discretionary bonuses or incentive payments in a given year, as long as the payment is made within one payday of the end of the 52-week period.
Omit any automatic updates to the salary threshold and instead reiterates its determination to update the earnings thresholds more regularly through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Repercussions for Employers:
Employers who fail to satisfy the minimum salary level will lose the exemption for their employees and be required to pay overtime at the legal rate.
Thus, employers must immediately audit and reclassify affected employees in order to ensure overtime eligible employees are paid their due, that salaries are increased or other compensation is introduced to avoid overtime eligibility. The Department of Labor estimates that 1.3 million workers will become non-exempt when the proposed rule becomes effective, yours might be one of the 1.3 million to be affected.
An audit would consist of reviewing payroll records for salary history, reviewing job descriptions for exempt/non-exempt classification, consider options to pay the affected employees more, or reassign their duties to avoid the need for overtime hours.
An audit should also include a review and revision of benefit plans that determine eligibility and other metrics on salary or exempt/non-exempt status.
Some states have thresholds higher than the federal even after this change, such as New York. Georgia follows the federal rules. Apply the rules appropriate to the state in which you have employees.
Call our office or visit the Department of Labor’s website for more information on how to implement these changes in your workplace.
With the inclusion of anti-retaliation provisions, Congress protected the rights granted in several employment related statues. An anti-retaliation provision prohibits any adverse employment action taken against an employee because that employee either opposed a practice prohibited by law or participated in the enforcement of a right provided by law. Some statutes provide both “opposition” and “participation” protections such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), 42 U.S.C § 1981, USERRA 38 USC § 4311(b), American Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Some statutes include only a “participation” protection such as the Family Medical Leave Act 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2).
To prove retaliation, an employee can either present overt (also known as direct) evidence of the employer’s intent to retaliate. Or, the employee can provide circumstantial (also known as indirect) evidence, which can then be rebutted by the employer. In order to establish the basis or “prima facie” circumstances, an employee must prove the following: (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal connection exists between the two.
The ADEA, ADA, FMLA and Title VII require a “but for” causal connection not just the lesser “motivating factor”. For FMLA claims, the employee must first prove that he was eligible and entitled to FMLA leave before proving the remaining parts of the prima facie case.
Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual by presenting evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.
An “adverse employment action” is any type of action that would have made a reasonable employee reluctant oppose the practice or participate in the enforcement of the law. Adverse actions take many forms. These include, but are not limited to, termination of employment, demotion, failure to hire or rehire, failure to promote, reduction or denial of benefits, etc. While valid business decisions will necessarily require some of these adverse actions, the employer must demonstrate that its reasons are indeed valid and not pretext for retaliation.
The devil is really in the details when it comes to pretext. Some of the most common tell-tale signs are: suspicious timing, inconsistent reasons, comments that call stated reason into question, conflicting evidence such as citing poor performance but having no record of discipline, among others.
Remedies available to an employee who is successful on a claim of retaliation would be entitled to extensive damages.
Alternative dispute resolution became all the rave for a cheaper and quick route to solve legal issues. Employers bought into the idea quite heavily under the misunderstanding that arbitration is faster, less formal, and less expensive than bringing a case to court. But, this may not always be true.
It is important for all parties to clearly think their options through before deciding what to do – just because arbitration is an available option does not mean it is always the best one. Take for example, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals case Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors, Inc., No. 17-13057, 2018 WL 3761126 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2018). In that case, Julio Hernandez claimed that his employer, Acosta Tractors, failed to pay him overtime, and he brought an action in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Acosta Tractors moved to dismiss the case because Mr. Hernandez signed an arbitration agreement. The judge agreed and dismissed Mr. Hernandez’s case in favor of arbitration.
Once in arbitration, things started to go poorly for Acosta Tractors. Mr. Hernandez was one of three employees who were arbitrating FLSA claims. Acosta Tractors asked the arbitrator to consolidate the three proceedings into one, but the arbitrator refused. Then, the arbitrator refused to limit discovery, resulting in the taking of 29 depositions in the three separate proceedings.
It is important for parties to understand that an arbitrator is essentially a judge on retainer. Meaning that when they work on a case, arbitrators bill the parties for their work. And, if a third-party organization like the American Arbitration Association or Henning Mediation & Arbitration Service, Inc. is involved, they will charge for their work managing the case as well. Neither of these two costs are applicable in court proceedings.
Acosta Tractors soon received bills for administrative fees of over $100,000.00 for Mr. Hernandez’s case and the other two similar cases, much much more than the amounts in dispute for the claimants. Acosta Tractors refused to pay the arbitration fees, and then asked the federal judge to return the matter to court on the grounds that “the Arbitration of this matter has failed of its essential purpose.” The judge declined, ruling instead, that Acosta Tractor defaulted in arbitration, and thus was also in default in federal court. The judge entered a default judgment in Mr. Hernandez’s favor in the amount of $7,293.00.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the trial judge should not have entered a default judgment based solely upon the failure to pay administrative fees in arbitration. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit directed the trial judge to determine whether Acosta Tractors “acted in bad faith in choosing not to pay its arbitration fees.” The court noted that “[a] calculated choice to abandon arbitration after getting adverse rulings from the arbitrator certainly looks like forum shopping.”
In this case, Acosta Tractors was billed $25,875 in administrative fees on an overtime claim that was worth $7,293.00. In the end, this is $18,582 Acosta Tractor could have saved by either settling the claim, or by keeping this FLSA case in federal court. This demonstrates that the decision to arbitrate a claim is not a guarantee that the arbitration will be less expensive than an action in court, or that it will be less onerous in the discovery stage.
The biggest lesson for employers to learn from Hernandezis the need to consider the cost of arbitration both when drafting agreements and in seeking to enforce them. Arbitration may be expensive for all parties, especially the employer who is usually on the hook for arbitrator and administrative fees. A carefully drafted arbitration agreement can include terms such as fee-sharing, limited discovery and right of appeal ensure that arbitration lives up to the ADR hype.
By Hauwa Adamu
In Bostock v Clayton County and Evans v Georgia Regional Hospital, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that reliance on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation failed to state a claim recognizable under law.
Background
Evans v Georgia Regional Hospital
Jameka Evans worked at the Hospital as a Security Officer from August 2012 to October 11, 2013. During her time at the Hospital, she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and targeted for termination for failing to carry herself in a “traditional womanly” manner. She experienced a hostile work environment. She was denied equal pay or work, harassed and physically assaulted.
Although she was a gay woman, she did not broadcast her sexuality. However, it was evident that she identified with the male gender, because of how she represented herself. Evans was punished because her status as a gay female did not comport with the Hospital’s gender stereotypes.
Evans lodged a complaint with the Human Resource department about some adverse treatment at work. Shortly thereafter she also complained that she was harassed and retaliated against because of her complaint. HR indicated that the Hospital had investigated Evans’ complaint, and had found no evidence that she had been singled out or targeted. Evans voluntarily resigned.
Bostock v Clayton County
Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare service coordinator in 2003. During his 10-year tenure at Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league.
During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed as part of his job.
Shortly after, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for conduct unbecoming of its employees. Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with EEOC following which, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the County alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII.
The Courts
In Evans, at the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Magistrate judge Smith issued a report and recommendation (R&R) dismissing Evans Complaint for failure to state a claim. The Judge concluded that while same-sex harassment can be actionable under Title VII, Title VII discrimination claims based upon the plaintiff’s sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation is not. Judge Randall Hall concurred with Judge Smith’s R&R and dismissed Evan’s case.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Evans request for an en banc rehearing, stating that Evans’ pro se Complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to create a plausible inference that she suffered discrimination. It stated: “Evans did not provide enough factual matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in a masculine manner led to the alleged adverse employment actions.”
Evans then filed a petition for certiorari, requesting review from the SCOTUS. Regardless of the fact that several friends-of-the-court briefs were filed urging the SCOTUS to hear the case, including briefs from 79 businesses and organizations, the Court denied review of the case, leaving for another day resolution on whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In Bostock, the US District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case in the same grounds.
After more than nine conferences during which the US Supreme Court could have acted on the petition for review, the SCOTUS has granted review in this case and two others that concern anti-LGBTQ employment discrimination. The cases will be heard in the Court’s 2019-2020 term to create a binding precedent and decide the issue for all courts.
In Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., No. 15-11362, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 8450 (11th Cir. Mar. 21, 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit – which covers Florida, Georgia, and Alabama – clarified what the term “similarly situated” means for purposes of Title VII claims of intentional discrimination. Of course this new test still requires an inquiry into the specific facts of each case, but it at least offers some clearer guidance that will hopefully help both employers and employees understand the law around workplace discrimination.
In order to prove discrimination in Title VII cases under the new guidelines, a Plaintiff must show that other people were treated differently under the same or similar situations, and that those other people were “similarly situated in all material aspects.”
Background
Jacqueline Lewis, an African-American woman with a documented heart-condition, was a detective with the Union City Police Department. In 2009, she suffered a heart attack but was later cleared to return to work without restrictions. In 2010, the police department issued a new policy requiring officers to carry Tasers. To carry a Taser, officers were required “to receive a five-second Taser shock” so they could have firsthand experience with the weapon, helping them evaluate when to use it and testify in court about the effects. Officers were also required to receive pepper spray training.
Lewis’ doctor informed the department that she “would not recommend” that a Taser or pepper spray be used “on or near” Lewis, given her “several chronic conditions including a heart condition.” Given these restrictions, the police chief determined that Lewis could not perform the essential functions of her job and placed her on administrative leave until she was cleared to return to “full and active duty.”
Lewis exhausted her accrued leave and did not complete the required Family and Medical Leave Act paperwork to obtain additional leave. Therefore, she was discharged pursuant to the Union City Personnel Policy, which provides that “[a]ny unapproved leave of absence [is] cause for dismissal.” Lewis then sued the City and the Police Chief for race, gender, and disability discrimination.
In her lawsuit, Lewis alleged race and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
She identified two white male detectives who failed physical fitness tests, but received more time to correct their failures. Lewis argued that the men were “similarly situated” to her, but were treated more favorably because of their race, gender, or disability status.
The Courts
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the proffered comparators did not qualify as “similarly situated” under the “nearly identical” or the “same or similar” definitions previously articulated by the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit panel also found “a genuine issue of material fact” on issues including whether the two white male employees were valid comparators, and rejecting use of the “nearly identical” test under the circumstances.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, in part, and held that the two men were valid comparators. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s decision and took the case to clarify the proper comparator standard in cases alleging intentional discrimination.
In Lewis, the court first declined to adopt the plaintiff’s suggestion that the “similarly situated” analysis should be considered during the pretext analysis, rather than during the prima facie stage, holding that this would effectively require the defendant to disprove discrimination. Under McDonnell Douglas,the plaintiff must present a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. If the defendant responds with a legitimate business explanation for taking the action in question, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s explanation is mere pretext. As the court noted, “discrimination is a comparative concept—it requires an assessment of whether ‘like’ (or instead different) people or things are being treated ‘differently.’” Therefore, by not requiring a qualitative comparison at the prima facie stage, “there’s no way of knowing (or even inferring) that discrimination is afoot.” The court held that a “meaningful comparator analysis must remain part of the prima facie case.”
Next, the Eleventh Circuit considered what the phrase “similarly situated” requires a plaintiff to show. In so doing, it sought to strike a balance between “the need to protect employees from invidious discrimination [and] the deference owed to employers’ rational business judgments,” as well as ensuring judicial efficiency by “making summary judgment available in appropriate (but by no means all) cases.”
While the court acknowledged that “all material respects” must be viewed on a case-by-case basis, the court sought to provide guideposts for courts—and, by extension, employers—about what might constitute “a similarly situated comparator”, including that comparators:
“will have engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff”;
“will have been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff”;
“will ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff”;
“will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history”; and
may not have the same title or precisely the same job functions.
Ultimately the court affirmed summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff could not show that her proffered comparators were similarly situated in all material respects. For example, the individuals in question received leave under a policy that was not issued until two years after Lewis’s discharge, suffered from different underlying conditions, and failed physical fitness benchmarks quite different from the training requirement that impacted Lewis.
The Takeaway
This decision shows us that, in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff seeking to prove intentional discrimination may succeed by demonstrating that similar employees were in fact treated differently – but while the narrower test may provide more clarity, it may also set the bar a little bit higher. This is a helpful finding for employers in the Eleventh Circuit. However, the new test does provide that differences between employees must be more than superficial in order to show that different treatment of employees can be considered defensible business judgment. For this reason, employers may no longer rely on differences in title or duties to justify different treatment of otherwise similar employees.
On April 10, 2019, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released detailed breakdowns of its work in fiscal year 2018 which ended on September 30, 2018. You can find details on its website but some remarkable statistics are as follows:
Received 76,418 charges of workplace discrimination
Resolved 90,558 charges of discrimination (including those filed in prior years)
Secured $505 million for victims in private sector, state and local government, and federal workplaces
Handled over 519,000 calls to its toll-free number, 34,600 emails and more than 200,000 inquiries in field offices
Filed 199 merits lawsuits alleging discrimination, including 117 individual suits and 45 suits involving multiple victims or discriminatory policies and 37 systemic discrimination cases
Achieved a successful outcome in 95.7 percent of all district court resolutions
Often, people inquire whether the #MeToo movement spurred more legal disputes. EEOC data demonstrates this was indeed the case. The agency also received 7,609 sexual harassment charges – a 13.6 percent increase from FY 2017 – and obtained $56.6 million in monetary benefits for victims of sexual harassment.
However, leading the pack as the most frequently alleged basis of discrimination with 51.6% of all charges filed, was “retaliation”, followed by “sex”, then “disability” then “race”, then “age”.